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T
he U.S. economy performed extremely well
over the period of 1995-2000; but it appears to
have hit a wall at the end of 2000 and its poor per-
formance in the first few months of this year has
elicited talk of recession.The slowdown also seems
to have caught policymakers unprepared: as
recently as mid-December, the Federal Reserve
professed to be leaning toward further interest rate
increases. Yet in early January the Open Market
Committee convened by telephone and decided to
cut interest rates by 50 basis points, and followed
that with another 50 basis point cut in less than a
month. The prior restrictive policy has now been
fully reversed; and when combined with a similar
set of dramatic policy changes in 1998,there should
be some concern about whether policy itself has
become the source of the instability that it seeks to
combat.
However, the most striking feature of the econo-
my in recent years is the extent to which its per-
formance was dominated by developments in the
high-technology sector, both during the boom
and now during the slowdown. Thus, the overall
economy is being driven by cyclical develop-
ments in the high-technology sector. During the
boom period, the growth of aggregate demand
was spurred by a surge in domestic investment,
which we can attribute to purchases of high tech-
nology products,and a binge of consumer spend-
ing which I will argue can be largely attributed
to the wealth effects of the boom in high-tech-
nology equity prices. High-technology products
also had a large impact on the supply side of the
economy, providing for a surge in productivity
growth that allowed the U.S. to accommodate
the demand side boom without inflation (see
Table 1).
With the bursting of the high-technology bubble in
equity markets and the consequent loss of wealth,
consumer spending has slowed; but the most sub-







Annual Rates of Change in Prices, Wages and Productivity
December to December percent changes
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Consumer Price Index 2.8 2.6 2.6 3.3 1.7 1.6 2.7 3.4
ex. Food and fuels 3.1 2.7 3.0 2.6 2.2 2.5 1.9 2.6
Producer prices
Crude 0.4 – 0.6 5.6 14.7 – 11.7 – 7.4 15.7 31.4
Finished 0.2 1.7 2.2 2.9 – 1.2 – 0.2 3.0 3.6
ex. Food and fuel 0.4 1.6 2.6 0.6 0.1 0.3 0.9 1.2
Employment cost – Private Sector
Total compensation 3.6 3.1 2.7 2.9 3.3 3.4 3.4 4.4
Wages and salaries 3.1 2.8 2.9 3.3 3.8 3.7 3.5 3.9
ex. Sales occupations 3.0 2.9 2.8 3.3 3.7 3.1 3.6 3.9
Hourly earnings 2.6 2.7 2.9 3.9 3.7 4.0 3.5 4.3
Productivity growth
Nonfarm 0.1 1.3 1.0 2.7 2.0 2.8 2.9 3.4
Manufacturing 2.2 3.1 3.9 4.1 5.0 4.8 6.4 6.5
Unemployment rate
(annual average) 6.9 6.1 5.6 5.4 4.9 4.5 4.2 4.0
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor.
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for high-technology capital.
The implosion of internet start-
up firms has left the industry
with excess capacity, there has
been a slowing of the pace on
new product innovations, and
financial strains have led other
firms to slow the pace of their
purchases of high-technology
capital.The result is likely to be
a transitory slowing of GDP
growth to an annual rate of
about one percent in the first
half of 2001, and a return to
growth at 3 percent or above in
the last half of the year.
However, the effect on govern-
ment policy may be more long-
lasting, as the Chairman of the
Federal Reserve has used the
slowdown as an occasion to
actively support a previously
unpopular proposal for a large
multi-year tax reduction. Thus,
it will likely mark the end of a
policy mix of fiscal restraint
and monetary ease that was in
effect for most of the 1990s.
In what follows, I would like to
discuss the underlying cause of
the boom in somewhat more
detail before turning to the cur-
rent economic outlook.In addi-
tion, the economic boom has
had a profound affect on the
U.S. fiscal situation and trans-
formed the debate in ways we
never would have anticipated
an few years ago. Finally, the combination of a
boom in investment and a sharp drop in saving has
generated a very large current account deficit.The
deficit in turn has stimulated concerns, more out-
side than inside the United States, about the sus-
tainability of the expansion in future years.
The Role of the New Economy
As shown in Fig. 1, there has been a remarkable
collapse of household saving in the United States
over the past 15 years. I believe that decline can be
traced to two phenomena: innovations in the mar-
ket for home mortgages and the rise in the wealth-
income ratio. Most Americans finance their homes
with 30-year mortgages. Prior to the 1970s, these
were truly long-term contracts that were binding
on both the borrower and the lender. But under
political pressure from homeowners, the govern-
ment eliminated prepayment penalties for borrow-
ers who wanted to repay the loan at an earlier peri-
od. Thus, borrowers have both the flexibility of
short-term borrowing and the security of long-term
credit. In addition, the costs of refinancing a mort-
gage have been dramatically reduced by other reg-
ulatory changes, innovations in the mortgage mar-
Figure 1
Saving (NIPA) is from the national accounts; Saving (FoF) includes the net accumulation of
consumer durables.
Source: Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds (FoF) Statistics.ket, and expanded competition
among mortgage lenders.
As a result of these innovations,
periods of decline in mortgage rates
now trigger episodes of mass refi-
nancing of mortgages.If it were sim-
ply a roll over of debt at a lower
interest rate, it would be of little
economic consequence. But most
homeowners cannot avoid the
temptation to increase the mortgage
amount, converting gains in their
home equity to cash, and repaying
their consumer credit. Mortgage
interest is tax-deductible and the
rates are much lower than for con-
sumer credit. Note in the charts that
consumer credit is an unchanging
ratio to disposable income, whereas
mortgage debt continues to rise.
This is a relatively new mechanism
for translating real estate gains into
immediate gains to consumer
spending;but it is also very sensitive
to variations in interest rates,
because it is only attractive when
interest rates are declining.
The second factor behind the growth of consumer
spending is the rise in the wealth-income ratio; and
as can be seen in the figures,the wealth gains can be
traced to increases in equity prices. Much of this
wealth is held in retirement accounts, but with the
conversion to defined-contribution accounts whose
value goes up and down with the market, more
Americans are aware of the short-term changes in
their retirement situation, and a large proportion
borrow against those retirement accounts to finance
more immediate expenditures. In addition, the pro-
portion of American households with equity market
investments had increased to about 50 percent by
the end of the 1990s.
Over the past decade, the net wealth of the
household sector has increased from 5 times dis-
posable income to 6.5 in mid-2000.The increased
value of equity holdings, both direct and indirect
through pension funds, represented 85 percent of
that increase. The increase in equity values, in
turn, was dominated by the performance of the
technology sector. Even though technology
stocks accounted for only 10 percent of the S&P
index in 1991, they rose 10-fold over the follow-
ing eight years to the point where they represent-
ed a third of the overall index in early 2000. Non-
technology stock rose by 150 percent over the
same period.
Business investment has had a long and remark-
able expansion during the 1990s, admittedly from
very depressed levels at the beginning of the
decade. Again, as shown in Fig. 2, investments in
information processing capital completely domi-
nated that growth. High-technology capital is con-
ventionally defined to include computers, comput-
er software, and communications capital. While
these components are an increasing share of nomi-
nal investments, their spectacular growth is the
result of large reductions in quality-adjusted
prices. It is important to note that part of the dif-
ferences in the reported rates of growth and invest-
ment between the United States and Europe can
be traced to differences in how we measure the
real value of such investments; but in any case the
production of high-technology capital is a more
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On the supply side, the rate of productivity growth
has accelerated over the last five years by about
11/2 percentage points, from 1.3 percent in the
1973-95 period (see Fig. 3).We can also factor that
improvement among three components. About
one-third of the gain can be traced to productivity
gains in the production of high-technology prod-
ucts;another one-third is the result of the large rise
in the capital-labor ratio (as previously mentioned,
largely the result of high-technology investments.);
and one-third reflects gains in multifactor produc-
tivity outside of the high-technology sector.
The source of the last one-third of the gains remains
controversial. Some analysts want to attribute it to
supra-normal returns to information technology
(network and similar effects), while others maintain
that much of this improvement will prove to be
cyclical or transitory in its effect. Interestingly, the
current slowdown will provide a partial test of the
importance of the cyclical factor. In either case,
high-technology would appear to be the dominant
source of the improvement in productivity growth,
Just as it was the primary story behind the boom on
the demand side of the economy.
The Slowdown 
So what happened at the end of 2000? First, a
restrictive monetary policy cut the growth of resi-
dential spending and a reduction in the refinancing
of mortgages was a factor behind the growth of
consumer demand. But the rise in interest rates
also played a role in pricking the bubble of equity
prices, particularly in the high-technology domi-
nated NASDAQ. Much of the
rise of the NASDAQ in late
1999 was clearly unsustainable,
as price-earnings ratios reached
absurd levels; and the U.S.
experience with internet star-
tups seems to have been built
largely on exaggerated hype. In
any case, the resulting wealth
losses have had an impact on
consumer spending.
The abrupt turnaround in capi-
tal spending was more surpris-
ing.Real expenditures on infor-
mation capital fell at a 5 per-
cent annual rate in the 4th quar-
ter,in dramatic contrast to the double-digit rates of
growth in prior years. More generally, capital good
orders also plunged in the final few months. To
some extent the NASDAQ collapse may have been
an occasion that led firms to reevaluate their bud-
gets for high-technology products. In addition, the
lack of new developments in computer hardware
and software made it unnecessary to replace com-
puters at the pace of past years.This is reflected in
a much slower rate of quality improvement in the
government price indexes for computers during
2000.Also, a decade of rapid growth in investment
outlays has pushed up corporate indebtedness, and
financing restrictions are becoming of increasing
importance.
The Federal Reserve has responded to these devel-
opments in a very confusing fashion that may
reflect a lack of consensus on future policy. Rates
were cut very quickly and by large amounts, and
some of Greenspan’s remarks seemed designed to
promote recession fears. For a while, it looked like
the new Administration and the Fed were trying to
generate a recession to strengthen the case for tax
reductions. But more recently Greenspan has
backed off and argues that there is no immediate
need for further actions.
Outside the government, there are expectations of
further interest rate cuts. Primarily, this reflects a
view that the economy is fundamentally in very
good condition,that there is no economic reason for
a recession, and therefore the Fed should do every-
thing it can to be sure that a recession does not
occur. Certainly, the Fed has the power to prevent a
recession should it desire to do so.Thus,nearly all of
Figure 3the forecasts show a V-shaped slowdown in which
growth is not negative for more than one quarter,
and it recovers to a trend growth rate of 3–31/2 per-
cent. This outlook is based on a continuation of
modest inflation pressures, and as shown in the
attached table, there are still few indications of a
significant rise in the inflation indicators.
The Changing Fiscal Situation
Among the most dramatic developments of recent
years has been the disappearance of the budget
deficit as the dominante issue of political conflict
in Washington (see Fig. 4). In just three years, the
fiscal outlook went from large and growing deficits
as far as the eye could see to large and growing sur-
pluses equally far out into the future. In just the
two years from March of 1997 to January of 1999,
the projected fiscal balance for the year 2005 shift-
ed from a deficit of $200 billion to a surplus of $300
billion; and this year the projected surplus was
increased to over $400 billion.According to the lat-
est forecasts of the CBO, the fiscal
surplus would reach 5 percent of
GDP by 2010 and the government
would retire all of the publicly-held
debt. Most surprising, this changed
budget situation is the product of
little or no legislative action.
Instead the fiscal turnaround is the
result of a higher rate of projected
growth,based on a continuation of
the pickup in productivity growth,
and a sharp rise in the effective
rate of personal income taxation.
The increase in the effective tax
rate, in turn, largely caught the
budget forecasters by surprise,
with large unanticipated revenue
inflows beginning in 1997. It
reflects an unusual concentration
of the income gains of recent years
among the highest income groups
who pay the highest marginal rates
and very large revenue windfalls
from the taxation of capital gains
realizations. The income gains of
the lowest income groups have
been surprisingly modest through-
out the expansion. In the short
run, the realization of capital gains will continue,
even in a declining market, but the sustainability
of the high revenue yield rate is a critical area of
conflict in the argument over the long-term fiscal
outlook. Furthermore, the projections assume
continued strong restrictions on spending that
reduce the ratio of federal government expendi-
tures to GDP to levels not seen for the past half
century.
The current argument over fiscal policy is primarily
a political dispute with little role for economic fac-
tors.Conservatives have learned over the past quar-
ter century that deficits can serve as the most effec-
tive restraint on new expenditure proposals, and
advocacy of tax reductions is far more popular than
opposing new programs as being too costly. Thus,
they will seek to eliminate the surpluses as a means
of maintaining pressures for scaling back expendi-
ture programs in future years. Similarly, liberals
would like to use the funds to finance new pro-
grams, particularly expanded health care for the
elderly. Advocates of saving the surplus as a means
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ing or to improve the financing of the old-age retire-
ment programs are in a distinct minority.
The most reasonable projection is that President
Bush will achieve most of his tax reduction pro-
gram, and that his own proposals for defense
expenditures and a compromise with the Demo-
crats on nondefense spending will eliminate the
projected surpluses on the budget exclusive of the
public Social Security programs. I would expect
projections for the non-Social Security budget to
return to rough balance within the next two bud-
get cycles.
The Current Account
The economic concern with these budgetary out-
comes lies with their implications for rates of
national saving in future years and the pressures
that will be placed on the current account. Over
the past decade, improvements in public sector
saving have fully offset the decline in private sav-
ing.Thus, the rise in the current account deficit to
near five percent of GDP can be traced to
increases in domestic investment (see Table 2 and
Fig. 5).With the scaling back of public sector sur-
pluses, there would seem to be a potential future
problem of inadequate national saving. Barring a
stock market collapse that would reverse the
wealth gains of the past decade, there is little
basis for projecting improvements in private sav-
ing rates. That implies, in turn, a continued large
reliance on capital inflows from the rest of the
world; or a substantial decline in the rate of
domestic investment.
Much of the external discussion has centered
around the sustainability of the foreign capital
inflows; but the issue generates surprisingly little
concern within the United States. Because of the
improvement in public sector saving, most of the
growth of the current account deficit has been a
reflection of very positive investment opportuni-
ties in the United States, and the fact that a
booming U.S. economy has been the engine of
growth in an otherwise weak and fragmented
world economy. While Europe has been doing
fairly well with a focus on its own internal eco-
nomic concerns, the countries of Asia and Latin
America have become increasingly dependent on
exports to the United States to sustain their
economies.That situation is unlikely to change in
the near future,given the continued deterioration
of the Japanese economy, financial sector weak-
nesses in the rest of Asia, and a decidedly mixed
situation in Latin America.
In an increasingly global capital market, national
balances seem less relevant as long as countries,
like the United States, are unconcerned about
foreign ownership of their production facilities.
At present, we can see no evidence of a rising
risk premium for investments in the United
States, and U.S. governments and corporations
still find it advantageous to borrow in their own
currency.
Even if foreign investment capital should find
alternative outlets, the implication for the United
States would seem to be a declining real
exchange rate and improved export opportuni-
ties. Only if the capital outflow should generate a
Table 2
Net Saving and Investment by Sector, 1960–2000
Percent of net national product
Sector 1960–69 1970–79 1980–89 1990–95 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Saving 12.0 9.6 6.7 4.7 5.7 6.7 7.5 6.9 6.7
Private 10.9 10.9 10.2 8.6 7.4 7.0 6.3 4.7 3.2
Household 6.4 7.6 7.6 6.1 4.0 3.5 3.4 1.8 0.1
Government 1.1 – 1.3 – 3.5 – 3.9 – 1.7 – 0.3 1.2 2.1 3.5
Investment 12.5 10.7 7.3 5.4 6.2 7.1 7.2 6.0 5.7
Private 9.4 9.0 7.5 5.1 6.7 7.6 8.6 8.5 9.2
Government 2.6 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4
Net foreign 0.4 0.2 – 1.7 – 1.0 – 1.6 – 1.7 – 2.6 – 3.8 – 4.8
Statistical discrepancy 0.6 1.0 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.4 – 0.3 – 0.9 – 1.0
Capital consumption 10.9 12.3 14.2 14.1 13.9 13.9 14.0 14.3 14.4
2000 is average of three quarters. – Net saving excludes capital consumption allowances.
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Department of Commerce, National Income and Product Accounts.precipitous decline in the dollar, with resulting
inflation pressures, would the implications be
particularly negative for growth. While a current
account adjustment may be an important issue in
the long-term outlook for the U.S. economy, it
does not seem to be determining the near-term
outlook. I would conclude that the United States
still has room to continue the current economic
expansion; and, while there are some signs of
increasing strains, they do not signal a recession
in the near term.
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Figure 5